As the US and Ukraine hail signs of progress on a peace deal, certain key points present possible issues
Ukraine and the US appear to have agreed on a framework for peace in the Russia-Ukraine war.
This is a step forward from last week, when a 28-point peace plan developed by US special envoy Steve Witkoff had been discussed.
That document would have scuppered any Ukrainian and European hopes for a balanced settlement. In fact, it was an inexpert collection of ideas for a settlement that much favoured Russia.
To arrest that dynamic, the UK, France and Germany rapidly prepared a counter-draft, which was presented at a hastily convened weekend crisis meeting held in Geneva.
Flatteringly for the US delegation, that draft mirrored the structure of their 28-point and offered some symbolic concessions (G8 return for Moscow).
Yet, in substance, the document heavily defanged the US proposals, which is unlikely to have pleased Russian President Vladimir Putin.
In further discussions, Ukraine managed to whittle the document down further, to fewer core principles, which now seem to have been agreed with the US delegation. Additional discussions look set to follow soon in the US.
However, before we get too carried away, it is hard to see a deal that both Ukraine and Russia will agree to, despite the positive comments coming out of Washington and Ukraine.
There are plenty of stumbling blocks ahead.
Ukraine left out in the cold
Russia has demanded that Ukraine becomes a permanently neutral state.
According to the initial US proposal, Ukraine would have enshrined in its constitution that it will not join Nato, and Nato would agree to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.
But changing Ukraine’s constitution is difficult, and in fact impossible while the country is under martial law. Nato is also highly unlikely to change its founding treaty from 1949 with the aim of excluding the possibility of membership for a particular country.
According to the European counter-draft, a decision on Ukrainian Nato membership would simply be left to consensus within the alliance, where one single state, like Hungary or the US, could veto admission.
Both drafts confirm that Ukraine remains eligible for EU membership, which includes the common security and defence arrangements of the bloc – a prospect so far opposed by Moscow.
A fight for land
The European counter-proposal would impose a ceasefire but leave discussions on territory for later. However, in the US draft, all of Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk would have been “recognised as de facto Russian”. The same applies to the provinces of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, but only to the extent that Russia occupies them.
Controversially, the initial US text required Ukraine to withdraw from the heavily defended parts of Luhansk and Donetsk it still controls. These areas would then have a special status as a “neutral demilitarised buffer zone”, and Russian forces would, on paper, be barred from entering them after Ukraine withdraws.
However, there is no provision for an international presence on the ground to monitor compliance.
In saying that the territories “belong to Russia,” the US document came close to a formal, legal recognition of territorial change. This would cross the red lines of Ukraine’s constitution and of international law, which prohibits territory changing hands through the use of force.
Ukraine would also have been made to accept that all territorial issues of the “past 30 years” are definitely settled, cutting off the possibility of subsequent legal challenges.
Restricting Ukraine’s army
Under the US draft, Ukraine’s armed forces would have been limited to 600,000, down from some 900,000 personnel under arms. The peacetime strength of the Ukrainian armed forces was less than 300,000. The European draft pushes up the proposed limitation to 800,000.
Going against Russian demands, the US and European texts do not impose limitations on the importation of arms to Ukraine, other than Kyiv’s commitment to nuclear non-proliferation. This would allow the West to provide continuous and large-scale investment into Ukraine’s defensive capacity.
European security
Moscow has been demanding, since 2007, that there should be a new European security order, essentially rolling back Nato expansion since the end of the Cold War.
The US text proposed a “comprehensive non-aggression agreement” between Russia, Ukraine and Europe, flanked by talks to be held between Russia and Nato, mediated by the US, to resolve common security issues.
Last week’s US draft stated that “it is expected that Russia will not invade neighbouring countries”. In return, Nato will not expand further. This is a non-starter for Europe, and its plan removed this section entirely.
Ukraine’s future
The US-backed draft demanded fresh elections in Ukraine within 100 days of concluding the agreement, which reflects Moscow’s view that Ukraine has been existing under illegitimate governments. However, while elections are likely to take place after the conclusion of the conflict, they cannot take place sooner while the country is operating under martial law.
There was also no mention of war reparations in the US draft. Instead, the emphasis is on rehabilitation and reconstruction of Ukraine. In addition to financial packages from the World Bank, $100bn (£76bn) taken from Russian frozen funds would be invested in US-led reconstruction projects, with half of the profits going to Washington. The EU and its members were expected to contribute a similar sum.
The EU counterproposal simply states that Ukraine will be compensated financially, including through frozen Russian sovereign assets.
Sanctions are to be lifted gradually in both versions, depending on Russia meeting its obligations.
What happens next?
The proposals have focused international minds again on Ukraine, after attention was diverted to Gaza. The rapid release of the European counter-draft, after details of the US-backed draft were leaked, was a strong move from the UK, France and Germany to try to claw back some of the initiative.
In the meantime, Ukraine has persuaded the US delegation to settle on a more condensed and balanced draft. It is not yet clear whether this includes the most critical issues, like the territorial settlement and its legal recognition, or if some of the main sticky issues are yet to be agreed with Trump.
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Once there is a framework document in place, it will still need to survive contact with Russia. The Kremlin has already indicated opposition to the changed draft.
We could easily end up with a deadlock, the same way this current episode started.
Marc Weller is a professor of international law at the University of Cambridge and the director of the international law programme at Chatham House.
