Just how worried you should be about Russian ships off UK waters

Last week, Defence Secretary John Healey updated the public on the Russian “spy ship” Yantar, which was north of Scotland just outside UK territorial waters. “We are ready,” Healey said, while seemingly reserving the right to use force if the vessel entered British waters.

The ship ultimately headed off towards the Faroe Islands, tracked by a Royal Navy frigate. Days later, the Royal Navy tracked a Russian navy corvette and tanker passing through the English Channel on their way to Africa.

Both incidents raised fears of new Russian aggression and encroachments into the UK’s waters.

Russian maritime mischief isn’t new. Thirty years ago, I tracked Russian warships, submarines and spy vessels around the UK when I was an officer in the Royal Navy. But according to Healey, there has been a 30 per cent increase in Russian vessels entering UK waters over the past two years.

In 2022, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin said that the UK had seen a “phenomenal increase in Russian submarine and underwater activity over the last 20 years”.

This suggests a major uptick in Russian activity.

The UK needs to be able to defend itself and secure Nato’s maritime flank against the Russian Navy, but the capabilities to do so have been hollowed out over the last three decades. Remedial action is moving too slowly.

Control of the sea has always been critical for Britain as an island nation. Around 95 per cent of all UK imports and exports by volume are moved by sea. In 2024, shipping enabled almost £1trn in UK trade. We have the fifth-largest exclusive economic zone in the world.

Meanwhile, 99 per cent of our digital communications is carried on subsea fibre optic cables, three quarters of the UK’s gas supply comes via subsea pipelines, and high voltage underwater cables connect our national grid to Europe, allowing for the two-way trade of electricity. This dependence leaves the UK highly vulnerable.

The Soviet Union understood this and invested heavily in capabilities to map and sabotage critical infrastructure belonging to its adversaries. Vladimir Putin has maintained this focus.

Today, Russia has a fleet of specialist submarines, naval ships and auxiliaries that use an array of sensors, as well as both manned and unmanned underwater vehicles. The Yantar is able to send a crewed submersible down to below 20,000 feet and was previously detected by the Royal Navy a year ago, loitering off Cornwall, a chokepoint for trans-Atlantic underwater communications.

Healey has signalled that the UK is adopting a much more robust defensive posture to these activities, saying that “those who might enter our waters with malign intent, or try to undertake any malign activity, know that we see them and know that they will face the strongest possible response”.

Last week, Healey said he had changed the Royal Navy’s rules of engagement so that it could track the Yantar more closely when it is in wider UK waters.

The Royal Navy needs to protect maritime traffic in UK waters and critical undersea infrastructure. June’s Strategic Defence Review (SDR) said that it “must be prepared to deter maritime incidents similar to the sabotage of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and the cutting of undersea data cables in UK and international waters”.

To this end, a new surveillance ship, the RFA Proteus, was purchased. It was used during last year’s Yantar incident, alongside – unusually – a nuclear submarine. The UK also hosts a Nato base on the outskirts of London for robust coordination, monitoring and countering of underwater threats, and to deny any aggressor the cover of plausible deniability.

The Royal Navy has also rolled out the Excalibur, a 12-metre submarine and the largest uncrewed underwater vessel trialled by the UK to date. The vessel was formally unveiled in March and will undergo two years of sea trials.

But credible deterrence and defence require sufficient ships, aircraft and submarines ready to act, and these have all been hollowed out in recent decades.

The number of ageing frigates will soon dip to a paltry seven, before – on current plans – slowly growing to 13 in the 2030s. Only eight of these new ships will be fully anti-submarine warfare capable. Three offshore patrol vessels, including the HMS Severn, which is used in the Channel, will leave service in 2028 without an announced replacement. Meanwhile, many nuclear submarines remain stuck in port, awaiting refit or repair.

The Royal Air Force, for its part, now only operates nine P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. This is insufficient to guarantee adequate support for operations in home waters whilst simultaneously providing continuous cover for the strategic nuclear deterrent.

While the SDR recommended “evolution of anti-submarine warfare” and the use of drones for maritime surveillance, it was characteristically vague on previous plans to boost frigate numbers to 18. It also didn’t mention replacement offshore patrol vessels or patrol aircraft.

MPs have rightly questioned the UK’s ability to protect itself, and also to fulfil its commitment to Nato to be adequately resilient to withstand a major shock like a natural disaster or a hybrid or armed attack. Some have also complained that remedial action seems “to be moving at a glacial pace”.

Some action may be achieved by the forthcoming Defence Investment Plan, due by Christmas unless it is delayed again, which will put flesh on the SDR bones.

It is an opportunity to ensure our waters remain safe for those using them and that our vast network of underwater infrastructure remains protected. If not, we can expect plenty more Russian incursions and testing of our commitment to defend our waters.

John Foreman CBE is a retired Royal Navy officer and served as a UK defence attaché in both Moscow and Kyiv.